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WHITE FARMERS’ DEALINGS WITH LAND REFORM IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHERN 
LIMPOPO PROVINCE 
 
Abstract: Completing restitution, a key element of South Africa’s land reform 
programme, entails government acquisition of white-owned farms. Some white 
farmers are willing to sell and consequently the government has paid them full 
market-related compensation. Others, however, refuse to sell, a right they have 
under the terms of the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle to which the 
government has committed itself. Why white farmers refuse to sell, even when 
compensation is on offer, is poorly understood. This paper therefore draws on 
qualitative research concerning white farmers in the Levubu area of northern 
Limpopo province to fill this gap in knowledge. The paper asks why white 
farmers were refusing to sell land to make way for restitution. It interrogates the 
material and symbolic factors affecting farmers’ action and demonstrates that 
the respondents’ justified their stance in relation to shifts in power in the 
agricultural sector, developments in land reform practice, and the respondents’ 
strong emotional bond to the land. In so doing, the paper calls into question the 
underlying (materialist) logic of the government’s mode of land acquisition. 
 
Key words: Land restitution; South Africa; semi-structured interviews; willing-
seller, willing-buyer; White farmers; Limpopo province; Levubu. 
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WHITE FARMERS’ DEALINGS WITH LAND REFORM IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHERN 
LIMPOPO PROVINCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A central concern of South Africa’s post-1994 democratic governments has 
been to alter the country’s racially skewed distribution of land (Levin & Weiner 
1997). A land reform programme therefore exists to redistribute thirty percent 
of agricultural land from the country’s approximately 45 000 white farmers. 
One of the most pressing elements of land reform is restitution, a programme 
which enables groups of people dispossessed of rights in land under the terms 
of racially discriminatory laws enacted since the 1913 Natives’ Land Act to 
claim back their land (for excellent reviews of restitution, see Hall 2003, 2004). 
A key aim of restitution is to provide redress to those dispossessed of land prior 
to the apartheid era beginning in 1948 as well as those (or their descendants) 
among the 3.5 million people who were forcibly moved from ‘black spots’ in 
the so-called ‘white countryside’ into the apartheid-era reserves or ‘Homelands’ 
between 1960 and 1985 (Platzky & Walker 1985).i Valid claims for restitution 
for these injustices are compensated by transfers of land or other means, 
including cash payments. However, recent estimates suggest that only around 
6% of settled rural restitution claims have involved land transfers (Umhlaba 
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Wethu 2005). The remaining claims, though, are mostly rural and expectations 
are that they will involve land transfers.  
 
Whilst completing restitution entails the government buying particular tracts of 
land from them or other landowners and then transferring the land to 
beneficiaries, the South African government has been restricted in how it can 
acquire land. According to the terms of a ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ 
principle to which it has committed itself, the government must offer market-
related compensation to landowners. Moreover, landowners can sell to other 
buyers besides the government. Farmers, then, have discretionary power, 
tantamount to a veto, to decide whether to sell to the government (Lahiff 2005). 
The fact that the government committed itself to this restricted mode of 
acquisition reflects the experience of land reform elsewhere in Southern Africa, 
as Lahiff (2005) has noted, as well as the government’s broader commitment in 
the Interim and final Constitutions to protect private property rights (Ntsebeza 
2006). But the stance on land acquisition also has strong associations with the 
Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) thesis advanced particularly by World 
Bank economists Deininger and Binswanger (Deininger and Binswanger 1999; 
Ghimire 2001; Borras 2005). Under MLAR principles, land reform is intended 
to be a negotiated and de-politicized process in which landowners come 
forward to sell when offered market-rated prices for their land. An underlying 
assumption of MLAR and a critical aspect of the logic underpinning the mode 
of land acquisition adopted by the South African government, is that 
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landowners are motivated by material interests. Such an assumption might 
seem reasonable given the World Bank’s perspective; economic interests trump 
all others, in its view. However, experience of land reform in South Africa has 
already indicated that landowners are not motivated by economic interests 
alone.ii In particular, while some white farmers have agreed to sell their land 
and either move onto another of their properties or shift their investments into 
other economic sectors; many others obstinately refuse to sell. These latter 
farmers have market-rated compensation on offer but have not come forward to 
sell.  
 
It is of fundamental importance to note here that large numbers of white 
farmers refusing to sell is not necessarily a problem for the government’s 
redistribution programmes because, besides those refusing to sell, sufficient 
numbers of sellers may still come forward. Restitution, though, is a different 
matter altogether: expropriation eventually will be the government’s only 
option of acquiring land if insufficient numbers of white farmers agree to sell 
land. One high-ranking government official involved in the Limpopo restitution 
process said, “we will declare disputes with [those who refuse to sell] and we 
will expropriate. [There is] No other route. We will expropriate” (Personal 
Interview with Official from Limpopo Land Claims Commission, September 
2004). Yet, such comments by provincial officials notwithstanding, the 
government is “greatly reluctant” (Ntsebeza 2006 p.123) to take this route, not 
least, it would seem, because expropriation risks parallels being drawn between 
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South Africa’s land reform process and the controversial ‘fast-track’ (Bernstein 
2002) process of land reform in Zimbabwe. Consider here how conservative 
media raise alarm bells when South African government officials discuss 
expropriation: “‘Zimbabwe’ land option mooted by SA officials” (Business 
Day, October 16 2006; my emphasis). The situation with respect to restitution, 
therefore, prompts questions about why white farmers refuse to sell. It raises 
questions about the extent to which the logic underpinning the MLAR thesis on 
modes of land acquisition is suited to the task of delivering land for land 
reform. Are white farmers motivated by material interests alone; is the 
government’s willing-seller, willing-buyer principle likely to deliver sufficient 
numbers of sellers?  
 
In this general context, I argue in this paper that the case of white farmers in 
South Africa calls attention to the difficult task of determining whether material 
interests trump other interests of a more symbolic sort (and vice versa). One 
way to navigate this question, as some economic geographers have argued (e.g. 
Massey 1997; Ray & Sayer 1999), is by recognizing that the material / 
economic and the symbolic / cultural are mutually constitutive of one another; 
that is, “realms of life [such as the economic and the political] are mutually 
embedded” (Ettlinger 2003 p.149). This paper’s focus on white farmers’ 
dealings with the implementation of restitution acknowledges the mutual 
constitution of the economic and the cultural, of the material and the symbolic. 
It does so by interrogating relations between the material and symbolic 
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dimensions of white farmers’ dealings with land reform. The paper combines 
an interests in issues such as the farmers’ relations to shifts in power in the 
agricultural sector which favour larger-scale agri-businesses (Greenberg 2003; 
Mather and Greenberg 2003), developments in land reform practice which 
favour partnerships between some of those agri-businesses and land reform 
beneficiaries (Shaker 2003; Fraser 2007), white farmers’ political and cultural 
disarticulation from the state, and the respondents’ strong emotional bond to the 
land. I demonstrate that, for many of the white farmers in the Levubu area of 
northern Limpopo, the decision not to sell stemmed from their material and 
symbolic interests in the land. Receiving monetary payments was never likely 
to lead sufficient numbers to sell, a finding which calls into question the MLAR 
thesis and the basis for sticking with the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle.  
 
BACKGROUND 
White farmers as a group were once closely affiliated with the governing 
powers in South Africa. Afrikaner nationalism, which emerged in early 
twentieth century South Africa to challenge English-speaking whites’ 
dominance over the country’s political economy (O’Meara 1983, 1996), 
constructed an imagined community (Anderson 1983) based on the definition 
of distinguishing cultural traits and histories. Stories of wars with Africans and 
the British, as well as of Afrikaners’ Great Trek into the South African interior, 
highlighted their bravery and how they had suffered and endured injustice 
(Crampton 2001; Giliomee 2003). In the late 1940s, the parties of Afrikaner 
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nationalism, the Afrikaner Party (AP) and Herenigde National Party (later, the 
Nationalist Party [NP]), stressed the position of Afrikaner farmers in this 
imaginary, and promised to solve a labour shortage from which white farmers 
were suffering. Farmers were swayed and swung their votes towards the 
nationalists. The HNP won “56 of the 66 rural constituencies outside Natal, and 
its AP Partner won a further 5” (O’Meara 1983 p. 237-38) in the 1948 national 
election. The nationalists “organised agricultural interests on a national scale” 
(ibid. p. 238) subsequent to the 1948 election. Among the many features of the 
post-1948 apartheid state, of particular note was the extent to which the NP 
rewarded and offered protection to its agricultural constituency. Agriculture 
enjoyed “privileged access” to state institutions and policy-making during the 
apartheid era (Greenberg 2003 p.48). White farmers were close allies of the 
apartheid state. Consequently, the commercial agriculture sector enjoyed 
government subsidies, protection from international competition, and labour 
market policies that helped secure agriculture’s access to a supply of cheap 
labour.  
 
A lot, but by no means all, of this has changed with the advent of democracy in 
1994 and the failure of Afrikaner nationalism to retain control over the state. 
White farmers are now largely disarticulated from political power. South 
Africa’s governing alliance’s project of ‘transformation’ is seeking – albeit with 
great difficulty – to alter the social landscape. Thus, in the area of agrarian 
relations, post-apartheid government land reform policy aims to alter the 
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racially skewed distribution of land via redistribution and restitution, whilst a 
tenure reform programme exists to address insecure forms of tenure among 
historically disadvantaged groups living on white-owned farmers. Further, the 
old social order on white-owned farms which offered black farm workers and 
dwellers little if any legal protection against abuse is under attack (Human 
Rights Commission 2003). That having been said, it is worth noting that 
persisting social structures continue to confer considerable power to white 
farmers and their allies in some rural areas (Mayson et al. 2001; Steinberg 
2002), and evidence continues to emerge of farm workers and dwellers 
suffering injustices at the hands of some white farmers (Wegerif et al. 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, in the midst of the changing context in rural South Africa, there 
are some signs that the government’s land reform policies (and possibly the 
fast-track [Bernstein 2002] land reform in neighbouring Zimbabwe) have led 
some white farmers to agree to sell land for land reform. There are also 
instances of white farmers taking leading roles in creating post-land reform 
structures such as partnerships that, they claim, are supposed to be ‘win-win’ 
solutions to the land reform challenge (Farmers Weekly August 13 2004; Fraser 
2007). Yet there also is a large and vociferous group of white farmers which 
opposes the government’s approach to land reform, if not land reform itself. 
White farmers associated with the Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU), for 
example, are particularly vocal critics. Their stance on land reform has come to 
light in press releases, public statements, parliamentary hearings, and responses 
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to government announcements. Drawing parallels with Zimbabwe, the TAU has 
expressed concern over use of expropriation orders to acquire land for land 
reform and even threatened violence if the government uses expropriation more 
widely (Mail & Guardian, September 7 2005). TAU farmers refer to findings in 
alarmist books such as Du Toit’s (2003) The Great South African Land Scandal 
to justify their oppositional stance. One outcome of the land reform process, 
then, and a challenge for the South African government, is a heightened sense 
of tensions around the issue of land ownership. It is in the context of these 
tensions that the research presented here was conducted.  
 
The research seeks to fill a gap in knowledge about land reform. Various 
aspects of South Africa’s land reform programme have already attracted 
attention from geographers (Mather 2002; Ramutsindela 2002; McCusker 2004; 
Fraser 2007). Those contributions draw from the more extensive South African 
land reform literature (e.g. Cousins 2000; Lahiff 2001; Jacobs et al. 2003; Hall 
2003, 2004; Walker 2003, 2005, 2006; Ntsebeza & Hall 2006), as well as 
significant contributions tangentially interested in the South African case (e.g. 
Bernstein 2002; Borras 2003). However, although it is clear that white farmers 
play a critical role in affecting the pace and geography of restitution (Lahiff 
2005), the precise reasons why some might refuse to sell are less well known. 
Indeed, neither geographers nor the broader community of land reform 
researchers based in South Africa have paid too much attention to the role 
 10 
 
played by white farmers in the unfolding land reform drama.iii I now discuss 
how the materials presented here were collected.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY 
The research on the topic of why white farmers refuse to sell land for land 
reform took place in northern Limpopo (see Figure One) between August 2004 
and May 2005. I began the research by interviewing project officers working 
with Nkuzi Development Association, a non-governmental organization 
working with numerous groups of local people engaged in benefiting from land 
reform, particularly via the restitution programme. The interviews with project 
officers as well as restitution claimants helped by Nkuzi led me to focus on a 
group of restitution claims on white-owned agricultural land in the Levubu 
area.  The Levubu restitution claimants sought to restore land rights to 
descendants of those dispossessed in the late 1930s. They were high-profile and 
sensitive because the farms in Levubu were among the most valuable in South 
Africa and certainly among the most commercially developed in that area of 
northern Limpopo. The area consists of approximately 10,000 hectares of 
commercial horticulture farms producing mangoes, avocados, litchis, bananas, 
and citrus for local, national and international consumption. Perhaps as many as 
ten thousand people work on the farms in high season; consequently, the 
government had to get the transfer process right first time to ensure that 
restitution would not place at risk the farm workers’ jobs, or the production and 
foreign currency earnings from Levubu. Nkuzi project officers and some of the 
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restitution claimants indicated that the restitution process in Levubu was being 
held up by obstinate white farmers who refused to sell their land, even though 
the restitution claims were deemed valid by the Limpopo Land Claims 
Commission.  
 
 [INSERT FIGUE ONE HERE.  
CAPTION: Figure One: The Levubu area of northern Limpopo Province, South 
Africa]  
 
With the intention of asking why white farmers in Levubu were refusing to sell 
land, I therefore proceeded to contact white farmers in Levubu, first via local 
leaders of the Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) and then via local leaders of 
AgriSA, another, slightly less conservative organization of commercial farmers. 
I first conducted interviews with farmers involved at the higher level of local 
decision-making within the TAU and AgriSA. The TAU official agreed to give 
me with a list of thirty commercial farmers based in Levubu; the AgriSA 
official provided a list of twenty white farmers in Levubu. I proceeded to 
conduct semi-structured interviews with thirty white farmers between 
September and December 2004. All of the respondents were men. I also carried 
out additional, although shorter, interviews in early 2005 to verify particular 
pieces of information. Almost all of the interviews were recorded on cassette 
tapes. The respondents’ identities were protected by changing their names and 
precise locations. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, I organized 
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three discussion groups with white farmers in December 2004. The objective 
was to try to identify discrepancies, parallels, and commonalities between the 
claims made in individual interviews and what people said whilst in a group. 
Two groups consisted of farmers based in Levubu, whilst the other consisted of 
white farmers located elsewhere in northern Limpopo. The purpose of 
organizing the latter group discussion was to triangulate against the other two 
groups with a view to identifying (in)consistencies between the situation among 
white farmers in Levubu and farmers elsewhere. I also conducted ten semi-
structured interviews with white farmers outside of Levubu with a view to 
determining whether there were Levubu-specific issues raised in the interviews. 
I acquired the latter set of names following a ‘snowball’ technique. Finally, I 
conducted repeat interviews with a leading member of one of the two Levubu-
based farmers association and other repeat interviews with farmers during April 
and May 2005. These were aimed at corroborating information and clarifying 
various issues. Whilst I am confident in the academic quality of the materials 
gathered, I recognize that any process of collecting qualitative data involves 
subjectivities that are difficult to manage. My objective was principally to gain 
insights into the attitudes and perceptions of the respondents, in this case with 
particular regards to why they were engaging with land reform in one way or 
another.  
 
REFUSING TO SELL: MATERIAL AND SYMBOLIC INTERESTS  
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The research in Levubu revealed that the white farmers were negotiating the 
restitution challenge in one of three ways. Some – 51 of the approximately 200 
white farmers – had agreed to the government’s offer to pay full market-related 
prices for their farms. Most of these ‘wiling-sellers’ had agreed to sell their 
farms with a view to remaining on the land either as partners with, mentors for, 
or tenants of the restitution beneficiaries. By early 2005, however, it was 
becoming clear that the government was leaning towards compelling the 
restitution beneficiaries to enter into partnerships with large-scale agri-
businesses. A second, much smaller group of Levubu-based white farmers were 
moving to benefit from the government’s shift towards partnerships. The 
farmers in this group owned fixed assets upstream and downstream of farming, 
such as a supply store in Levubu, nut-drying and juicing factories, as well as 
tree nurseries. They were the more successful, better capitalized farmers 
operating as agri-businesses, not just as individual farmers. They had decided to 
sell at the same time as the other willing-sellers but had split from the larger 
group at a subsequent stage. 
 
A final group of farmers – the focus of this paper – was refusing to sell their 
farms to the government even though the government had deemed the 
restitution claims valid and although government officials had stated that 
expropriation would be used to acquire all of the claimed farms in Levubu. This 
latter group, which had a vocal leadership aligned with the TAU, was mostly 
comprised of Afrikaner farmers, most of whom operated relatively small farms 
 14 
 
of approximately 40 or 50 hectares. Their refusal to sell land for restitution was 
frustrating both the intended beneficiaries and government officials and was 
heightening tensions over the restitution issue. The farmers’ stance was 
therefore an important aspect explaining the slow pace at which the government 
was settling the Levubu land claims. I now discuss why they were refusing to 
sell. 
 
Material reasons for refusing to sell – With respect to reasons of a more 
material sort, the white farmers refusing to sell consistently expressed concerns 
about their prospects in South Africa if they sold their farms. Some suggested 
that a reason not to sell was because it would be difficult to find a new farm or 
non-agricultural venture in which to re-invest. Reflecting racially imbued 
conceptions of the South African government and the suspicion that land 
reform is a rouse to get rid of the white farmer, some claimed there was no 
point in selling and moving elsewhere because, “the same [land reform] laws 
are going to catch me there” (Personal Interview, September 2004). This was 
echoed by one of the younger farmers in Levubu, Johannes: “There are guys 
that say, ‘No, just sell and go and buy a place somewhere else.’ I don’t know, a 
few years and you find that place is claimed as well and then you must leave 
there as well!” (Personal Interview, November 2004). The logics underlying 
their stance were imbued with racial understandings in other ways. I asked all 
the white farmers how they believed they would fair in the non-agricultural 
labour market. Typical responses highlighted Black Economic Empowerment 
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(BEE) policies which, according to the farmers, position them behind women 
and blacks at the back of the line for jobs. One farmer, Marcus, suggested that, 
“we wouldn’t be able to search for work anywhere else because we’re not 
black.” (Personal Interview, October 2004). Another claimed, that “if you are a 
white man under 30, forget it, you’ll never get a job.” (Personal Interview, 
October 2004). This sense of entrapment was captured by Hans: “Some say sell 
and go and do something else, but where do you go? I mean, we can’t all do a 
different job somewhere else… I’d still like to stay here… It’s taken me quite a 
few years to get the knowledge that I have now and now to start from the 
bottom somewhere else is going to be hard.” (Personal Interview, November 
2004). The white farmers’ understandings of the material interests at stake were 
caught up with questions of race and difference. 
 
Insofar as selling up and moving on was understood as difficult and risky, then, 
many of the respondents expressed a degree of spatial entrapment: even if they 
wanted to sell up and leave the land, their concern was that material 
circumstances would prevent them from doing so. Marius even suggested the 
problem was about finding replicable ecological conditions unaffected by land 
reform: ‘…the question is what do I do with compensation? Because there’s no 
farms where I can farm with macadamias or guavas, which is my main crops, 
that I can buy which is isn’t under land claims’ (Personal Interview, September 
2004). Staying on the land, then, seemed to make sense in terms of the 
respondents’ material interests in farming land with which they are familiar and 
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growing crops they have learned to understand. As Willem pointed out, “the 
soft option is to leave South Africa [but] that has its own problems because I’m 
not going to get residence in any first-world country in the world. So where 
must I relocate to? You’re an economic prisoner to South Africa.” (Personal 
Interview, September 2004).   
 
It is helpful here to view the stance of those refusing to sell in the light of 
changes within the agricultural sector in South Africa (Greenberg 2003; Mather 
& Greenberg 2003). Economic power in the agricultural sector is shifting to 
agri-businesses who, in turn, are increasingly using that power to squeeze 
individual farmers. These changes in South Africa reflect a broader global 
process in which an “emphatic neoliberal agenda for agricultural policy reform” 
(Potter & Tilzey 2005 p.587) focusing on market liberalization, deregulation, 
and the dismantling of state support has altered the organization of agriculture 
throughout the world. State-provided supports to white farmers in South Africa, 
which were designed to keep white farmers on the land and retain their political 
support, have been eroded as the state has targeted more efficient producers, 
which has tended to be the larger export-oriented conglomerates, cooperatives 
or agri-businesses (Greenberg 2003). As the larger, more capitalized, export-
oriented agri-businesses become increasingly dominant within the sector as a 
whole, small-scale individual farmers, such as many of those in northern 
Limpopo, face troubling times. What it means to farm is no longer as it perhaps 
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once was. One of the farmers noted this changing relationship between farming 
and business: 
 
The days when, ‘I’m a farmer and I’m only a farmer’ are long gone by. 
Open markets, no managing boards, banana boards are away. You’re not 
a businessman? You don’t know how to do your cash flow, your balance 
sheet? You won’t make it (Personal Interview, September 2004). 
 
Relations between the large and small farmer, between the more capitalized 
fractions and those operating at smaller scales, are further complicated in the 
context of land reform: while the stance of some has been to resist land reform 
by wielding the principal weapon at their disposal – refusing to sell – some of 
the better capitalized willing-sellers in Levubu have sought ways to remain on 
the land as partners with restitution beneficiaries. The government has 
expressed interest in working with some of them, especially those with a large 
asset base and the ability to bring money capital to the table (Shaker 2003; 
Fraser 2007). But even without such options, the stance of those who have 
agreed to sell seems to be emblematic of changes in the structure of agriculture. 
Some were already moving capital into other sectors, while others mentioned 
options they had begun to explore:    
 
I’ve been to a lot of courses and tried to look at options [outside of 
agriculture], but at this stage I’m thinking I’ll take [my compensation] 
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and move it into property and rent it out. I’ve started buying property in 
some places but not in the way that if the land claims don’t go through 
I’m in any trouble, not at all. I’m busy with my pension on another side 
(Personal Interview, November 2004). 
 
The more capitalized, larger-scale farmers, then, were not as spatially trapped 
or locally dependent as their counterparts who were refusing to sell. As owners 
of money capital they can hire people to supervise, hire advisors on what 
sectors to get involved in; or they may be invited to fund joint ventures. They 
are, therefore, not so place-bound; they can use their money capital in order, 
among other things, to spread risks geographically. One larger-scale farmer 
described exploring such an option:  
 
[I am] not necessarily relocating money but relocating some of my own 
skills or some of my children’s skills…That’s the way to relocate. […] 
We’re looking all over. I’m involved in the export of citrus. I export to 
18 different countries of the world and I get to go there very regularly. 
I’ve got my contacts. It’ll actually be really simple to relocate […] I 
didn’t start here with anything. I started with nothing. You can do that 
anywhere in the world (Personal Interview, November 2004). 
 
Those operating at larger scales in Levubu have been more open to the 
opportunities land reform presents; those operating at smaller-scales and used 
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to working with employees on the land, rather than with accountants and 
lawyers in boardrooms, have refused to sell, or have been simply unable to 
create a niche in the post-restitution environment.iv Thus, there are clear 
material issues underlying the stance of those farmers refusing to sell for land 
reform in northern Limpopo: they fear leaving the area and/or agriculture; they 
have doubts about the labour market and concerns that their farming skills will 
not prove to be as transferable as some of the willing-sellers claim is in fact the 
case.  
 
Symbolic reasons for refusing to sell – A second and closely interrelated set 
of reasons for the white farmers’ refusal to sell had to do with more symbolic 
issues. They claim that selling land is defeatist, an affront. It is by no means a 
material issue alone: working the land has social meaning beyond farming; 
trying to hold onto it is a political action. Many of the farmers refusing to sell 
justified their stance through reference to their identities as Afrikaners, Boers, 
“people of the soil, people of the land” (Personal Interview, September 2004).  
In accordance with the story of Afrikaner nationalism, some explained that their 
forefathers: 
 
…started 400 years ago; they trekked here, fought with malaria and the 
lack of infrastructure in order to build this, to leave this for us. You can 
still see their graves around here. We’re a stubborn people, persistent, 
strong-willed, and independent (Personal Interview, September 2004). 
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The experience of farming a particular piece of land, often with historical 
associations of a personal character, makes leaving the land very difficult. 
Many of the respondents explained how they and their forefathers transformed 
the area through “experience, blood and sweat, and worries” (Personal 
Interview, September 2004). They expressed aspects of an imaginary which 
stresses how they battled nature in transforming the land and in overcoming 
hardship. Thus, Tomas noted that:  
 
…it was very difficult. Very poor. No water. Malaria. No infrastructure. 
This road here was built by my father with two oxen and a plough. So 
there was no infrastructure. So what happened then was these people 
arrived here and started farming but as poor as mice. My father was 16 
years old. He didn’t even have shoes (Personal Interview, November 
2004). 
 
Farming the land is therefore important to the white farmers’ sense of social 
significance, their sense of having achieved something. The symbolic 
connection to the land which farmers express is germane to their resistance. 
Thus, the following statement by Jan is a common refrain among those refusing 
to sell: “I’m bonded to this place […] I have 100 years of roots on this place. I 
can see what my grandfather did, I can see what my father did…This land is 
our land” (Personal Interview, September 2004). Indeed, for some of the older 
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farmers, the prospect of selling is a challenge to their self-esteem, ultimately 
their subjectivities as Afrikaners and as men. Jan claimed: 
 
If I have to go out of here, the biggest loss will be my self-respect […] 
Because you’re being forced to do something you don’t want to do. If I 
give up, what do I tell my 20 year old son? (Personal Interview, 
September 2004). 
 
Given their fears about selling and their strong symbolic connection with the 
land, it is little wonder that some white farmers claimed they would do anything 
to remain in place. As Edgar, one of the older farmers noted,  
 
Between me and you, my friend, you’ll get my blood here. I’m not 
moving elsewhere. Where I am going to go? The street? I don't have a 
house in town. I have nothing else but this farm. All the money I have 
worked for and prayed for is in this farm. If I move out of that gate, I 
have the clothes on my body, and I’m not a youngster anymore. So 
what’s it to be? I’m not going to beg for a sleeping place or for some 
food. Forget it. I don’t say I’m going to make a war out of this, but 
you’ll find me here. There’s no other place to go. (Personal Interview, 
October 2004). 
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Having noted the white farmers’ material and symbolic interests in refusing to 
sell, it is worthwhile highlighting how the stance of refusing to sell was also a 
reflection of a particular imaginary about African farming styles; an imaginary 
that was used in conjunction with the ‘land scandal’ thesis advanced by Du Toit 
(2003) to further justify refusing to sell. In short, the white farmers’ story of 
inadequate African agriculture constructed their stance of refusing to sell into a 
noble endeavour; noble, that is, because they believed they were protecting 
South Africa by staying on the land. Of fundamental importance in this regard 
is the extent to which white farmers express racist, essentialist viewpoints about 
Africans. As Rutherford (2004) found during his research in Zimbabwe, it was 
common for white farmers to claim to understand the essence of their African 
“other”. A lengthy but fairly typical example is provided in the following quote 
about African farming practices: 
 
When you drive here all along the mountain, you will see the mountain 
there is all cut down. Scattered pieces of land. It was bush but now it’s 
all cut down. They are planting maize there. You’ll see them. Small 
plots of land, small little blocks, each and every one has a small block. 
One of my workers has a piece up there. I supplied the seed and I 
supplied the fertilizer to him to plant his maize. He had a good crop. He 
was very, very satisfied with his crop. 22 bags. Big bags. So I asked 
him, ‘Are you selling them, the extra bags because you can only use one 
bag a month?’ He said, ‘No, this year I won’t plant.’ That’s the mentality 
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of the people. They are real subsistence farmers. (Personal Interview, 
December 2004; my emphasis). 
 
Others explained that African farming practices, which they saw written on the 
landscape, were less commercially successful than the white farmers’ either 
because (a) “Successful people are a threat to Africans…because in [success] 
they see their inability to do that” (Personal Interview, December 2004); or 
because (b): 
 
One thing that is a huge problem to the black people themselves: they 
believe everybody is born equal. If somebody has got more than the 
next person, he has more because he took from someone else. And 
therefore they don’t appreciate one person getting up and surviving or 
making a profit. That’s not good to them (Personal Interview, 
November 2004). 
 
Whereas white farmers claimed they had transformed the country and made it 
successful, in the process “producing enough food to feed the nation” (Personal 
Interview, December 2004), the African subsistence farmer’s supposed lack of 
interest in making money would never achieve such dramatic results. Of course, 
by trying to identify the essence of Africans, the white farmers were attempting 
to define themselves in a more positive light. Such an essentialist interpretation 
of Africans underpins the broader argument within the predominantly white 
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commercial agriculture sector – and especially within the TAU – that directly 
transferring land to Africans is a mistake. They also illustrate the extent to 
which the Afrikaner farmer’s reading of South Africa’s history no longer fits 
with the increasingly dominant post-apartheid historical interpretation, which 
justifies land reform and which recognizes, rather than ignores, the multiple 
unequal socio-spatial structures which disadvantaged Africans and contributed 
to the production of particular types of agricultural landscapes. Government 
policy is now based on rejecting essentialist claims, achieving justice by 
undoing racist laws, and valuing African intellect. Such a normative view of 
South Africa’s past and future (however unevenly it has been pursuedv) 
underpins the Constitution, the land reform programme as a whole, as well as 
policies such as Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment, the latter of 
which is aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in the economy (Iheduru 
2004). Highlighting the disarticulation between white farmers’ essentialist 
viewpoints and the orientation of government policy, government officials in 
Limpopo noted that, whilst they might seek out white farmers to become 
partners with land reform beneficiaries, those farmers must reject racism. A 
high-ranking government official commented as follows on what sort of 
attitude white farmers need if they are to become partners with land reform 
beneficiaries: “In terms of attitude, he should have the right attitude. You’re not 
going to go into a partnership with somebody who still has the master-servant 
mentality, that, ‘I’m white, I’m superior, you’re black, you are only a worker.’ 
Because all of a sudden we have become equals…we need to respect each 
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other” (Personal Interview with Official from Limpopo Land Claims 
Commission, November 2004). Equally as much as officials compel white 
farmers to abandon their racist understandings of life in South Africa, policies 
and programmes such as land reform seek to create structures which move the 
country beyond them. Land reform is, after all, and as two of the government’s 
leading bureaucrats have noted, intended to transform the agrarian structure and 
create a new dispensation in which racist white farmers have no role to play 
(Mbongwa & Thomas 2005). The white farmers’ affiliations with the old order 
and expressions which demonstrate these affiliations are therefore increasingly 
redundant as the terrain within which they operate changes.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize the materials presented, the white farmers refusing to sell land 
for restitution in Levubu identified a variety of material and symbolic reasons 
for their stance of refusing to sell land. They expressed fears about the true 
intentions of the government. Changes in the structure of the agricultural sector 
had already left them vulnerable to competition from larger agri-businesses. 
The material stakes were high; selling and establishing a new economic niche 
was risky. But the farmers also expressed more symbolic interests. There were 
attachments to the land; senses of belonging closely bound up with their 
identities as farmers, as Boers. Selling would be an affront to some and a defeat 
for others. Staying on the land, moreover, was for some of the white farmers, 
including those at high levels of local decision-making in the Levubu-based 
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farming associations, a noble endeavour because they believed that South 
African agriculture would continue to survive if – and only if – they stayed on 
the land. In their view, Africans were inherently incapable of meeting the 
country’s economic demands. The farmers repeated claims advanced nationally 
by the TAU that land reform approaches that fail to involve white farmers will 
lead the country towards disaster. Thus, the decision to stay on the land was 
explained by some as a matter of principle. Others, meanwhile, explained it as a 
lack of choice; that is, the farmers expressed a strong sense of spatial 
entrapment, which compelled them to stay on the land. In short, their actions 
stemmed from material and symbolic reasons. I should like to argue that these 
material and symbolic reasons – the economic and the cultural – were mutually 
constitutive of one another.  
  
I would like to end the paper by suggesting what might be the significance of 
these materials for land reform policy. My research in Levubu illustrates one 
critical, yet largely over-looked aspect of the South African approach to 
delivering land reform: the logic guiding modes of land acquisition in South 
Africa. The South African government’s decision to acquire land via the 
‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ principle has attracted a lot of attention among 
observers of land reform in South Africa. Adherence to the principle is “one of 
the defining characteristics of the programme” (Lahiff 2005 p.1). Much of the 
attention has focused on whether the government should have adopted the 
principle, and whether it should continue to stick to it (e.g. see Eveleth & 
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Mngxitama 2003; Hall & Ntsebeza 2006 pp. 17-20). For understandable 
reasons, the interests of the intended beneficiaries of land reform have been at 
the core of the debate: the overriding question is whether the willing-seller, 
willing-buyer principle speeds up the delivery of land. I want to highlight 
another dimension of the issue. Insufficient numbers of landowners agreeing to 
sell their land demonstrates that offering them full (or, even above) market-
related prices will not guarantee that they will sell. Yet the logic of the willing-
seller, willing-buyer principle suggests they will. The logic is based on the 
assumption in the MLAR thesis that landowners are motivated primarily by 
material interests. This paper suggests otherwise; landowners are not motivated 
by material interests alone. The government’s approach to acquiring land, 
therefore, should be called into question. Its logic is unsuited to the real world 
conditions in which material interests cannot be assumed to trump all others. 
For some to the South African government’s left, such an argument will be 
succour to the position in favour of moving towards widespread expropriations 
of white-owned land. It was not my intention to lend support to that line of 
argument; however, it is difficult to imagine how the government will be able 
to complete restitution without taking such measures. 
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i
 ENDNOTES 
  At least 1.1 million African farm workers, tenants and ‘squatters’ were 
cleared off of white-owned land (Mamdani 1996 p.31) and around 800,000 
Africans were relocated in urban areas under the terms of the Group Areas Act 
(Mamdani 1996 p.35). The African population living in the homelands “grew 
from 4.2 million in 1960 (39% of all Africans) to over 11 million in 1980 
(52.7%)” (Beinart 2001 p.212). 
 
ii  Likewise, the hunger for land among the landless is not simply an 
economic matter. More cultural or symbolic factors are germane to many 
restitution claims, particularly those in which claims are closely intertwined 
with the desire on the part of the claimants to re-connect with ancestral graves. 
As Mathis (2007) has demonstrated, moreover, understanding claims for land 
cannot be divorced from issues of extra-economic power.  
 
iii  White farmers have certainly not been ignored in the non-geographical 
literature on South Africa. Noteworthy contributions include an edited 
collection on power relations on white farms (Jeeves & Crush 1997), an 
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account of post-apartheid struggles involving white farmers in particular 
regions of the country (Steinberg 2002), and the dynamics of agricultural 
restructuring (Greenberg 2003). 
 
iv  Arguably, the resistance of the smaller-scale farmers was partly a 
product of their exclusion from the settlement process. It was highly unlikely 
they would have had requisite financial or social capital to bring to the table 
even if they had wanted to become partners; if the government went looking for 
potential partners, the smaller-scale farmers would have struggled to compete.  
 
v  For example, as Rangan & Gilmartin (2002) note with respect to gender 
empowerment, government practice still deviates from the country’s 
Constitutional objectives.  
